Irish Flex-insecurity: The Post-crisis Reality for Vulnerable Workers in Ireland by Murphy, Mary
Irish Flex-insecurity: The Post-crisis Reality for Vulnerable
Workers in Ireland
Mary P. Murphy
National University of Ireland Maynooth, Dublin, Ireland
Abstract
Institutional reconfigurations of Irish welfare architecture and specific policy regimes including
social security, labour activation and employment regulation have reshaped the contemporary
low-paid labour market with more focus on flexibility than security. Irish workers, particularly
women, young people and vulnerable migrant workers are more likely to experience a form of labour
market precarity we term ‘flex-insecurity’. This Irish form of flex-insecurity occurs in a highly glob-
alized, segmented and gendered production regime. A particular model of competitiveness supports
light touch regulation, while government procurement policy and tendering practices promote a flex-
ible and low-paid labour force. Case studies demonstrate how the institutional reconfiguration of
income support, labour law and work-first activation policy impact on mothers, vulnerable migrants
and young people, disempowering these workers. The social politics of change is difficult, despite
growing awareness of the extent and impact of these forms of work and some solidarity for and with
these vulnerable workers, there remains considerable resistance to implementing policies to address
the growing problem of precarious work.
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Introduction
This article explores how, over the last two decades, institutional recon-
figurations of Irish welfare architecture reshaped the contemporary workplace
for many workers, particularly women, young people and vulnerable
migrants. It focuses in particular on how income support policy and work first
activation combine with weak labour legislation to disempower vulnerable
workers and promote different forms of labour market precarity. This Irish
form of ‘flex-insecurity’ occurs in a highly globalized, segmented and gen-
dered production regime (Murphy and Loftus 2015).
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Focusing on the contribution of social policy systems to labour dualization
(Fersch 2013; Gibb 2009) the article examines how recent institutional
reconfigurations of Irish welfare architecture combine to enable precarious
forms of employment (Moran 2016 ). Various methodological approaches
are utilized including literature reviews, development of a schema to explore
the concept of ‘flex-insecurity’, analysis of employment trends and policy
developments, qualitative post-crisis research into experiences of low-paid
workers in the case of low-income mothers and young people in internships,
working conditions of migrant domestic workers and observations from policy
processes.
The first section locates the article in labour precarity and labour dualism
literature (Gibb 2009; Daly 2010; Wickham and Bobek 2015), introduces
the concept of ‘flex-insecurity’, develops a schema to explore flex-insecurity
and discusses the drivers behind this change. The second section interrogates
the employment and low-paid landscape in Ireland highlighting the dispro-
portionate presence of women, vulnerable migrants and young people
amongst the low-paid. The third section briefly sketches recent reconfigura-
tion of social security and labour activation policy and shifts in employment
regulation. The fourth section introduces three short case studies to dem-
onstrate how welfare architecture works in different ways to shape and
constrain labour market possibilities of vulnerable workers and to highlight
the variegated experiences and intersectionality of this diverse group. The first
case study examines how low-income employment is often negotiated through
and shaped by gendered income support rules (Murphy 2012, 2016b). The
second examines young people’s interaction with the low quality and weakly
monitored unpaid labour market internship, JobBridge (Murphy 2015),
while the third explores the experience of vulnerable Irish migrant workers
in the unregulated home care sector where employers exploit the employee’s
vulnerable legal status and the absence of adequate employment regulation
(MRCI 2015b). The concluding section draws on the author’s participation
in various policy processes and submissions to parliamentary committees
and policy consultations to examine the social politics of low-pay in Ireland.
Labour Precarity, Dualism and Flex-insecurity
This section aims to theoretically frame the article, first clarifying the term
flexicurity and then introducing the term flex-insecurity. A systematic schema
is developed from flexicurity literature to guide subsequent empirical investi-
gation of the research question – how shifts in Irish welfare architecture com-
bine to produce Irish flex-insecurity. Flexicurity originated as a policy
framework in Denmark and The Netherlands in the early 1990s and was
defined by Wilthagen and Tros (2004: 4) as:
a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to
enhance the flexibility of labour markets, the work organisation and
labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance security – employment
security and social security – notably for weaker groups in and outside
the labour market.
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The concept of transitional labour markets (or steps in individual employment
trajectories) is linked to flexicurity in the sense of enabling flexible and positive
transitions between decent work and periods of unemployment (Schmid and
Gazier 2002); in theory, transitions are cushioned by generous welfare
schemes but relatively high levels of conditional activation (Viebrock and
Clasen 2009).
Each country has its own specific forms and mix of security and flexibility.
While the concept of flexicurity guided the European Employment Strategy,
pre-crisis Europe experienced a shift towards more precarious and poorer
quality employment (Gibb 2009 ) and dual labour markets with high degrees
of polarization between secure and insecure workers (Lewis 2011; Wickham
and Bobek 2016 ). Leschke (2011 : 162) argues European policy shifted from
flexicurity to stress employment growth over job quality and social cohesion;
Ireland was no exception (Daly 2010; Dobbins 2010 ).
This happened alongside a more conditional welfare regime, retrenchment
or recommodification of social security, and deregulation at the margin of the
labour market (Bettio et al.2012 ). Drawing on Berton et al.’s (2010) description
of Italian flex-insecurity, Murphy and Loftus (2015 ) termed similar Irish expe-
riences as Irish ‘flex-insecurity’. If flexicurity features good jobs, generous wel-
fare and a human capital oriented but conditional activation policy, then ‘flex-
insecurity’ features poor jobs, less generous welfare and a more conditional
work-first activation strategy (Berton et al. 2010). Darmon and Perez (2010:
84 ) associate recent labour market changes with recommodification of labour
and mobilization of a new form of ‘floating’ more portable and flexible
employees who are required to perform ‘standby-ability’ (Bengtsson 2014).
The argument is that more work-first activation, decreased social protection,
and light touch labour regulation interact to create more negative outcomes
for the vulnerable workers. To further examine flex-insecurity, we borrow from
the ‘flexicurity’ literature focus on three institutions: the labour law, the unem-
ployment insurance regime and the labour market policies (Schmid andGazier
2002), and which understands the ‘security’ aspect of the flexibility-security
nexus as job, employment, income and combination1 security (Wilthagen
and Tros 2004 : 6 ). For reasons of space, we omit consideration of employ-
ment and combination security and in the third section we briefly outline
recent changes in Irish social security and activation (income security) and
labour regulation market regime (job security). We focus primarily on post-
crisis changes, the period in which the most significant shifts in income and
employment security policies occurred or intensified in scope and impact.
While these patterns emerge across Europe, there are specific Irish demand
side drivers of precarious employment. Ireland appears consistent with Heery
and Salmon’s (2000) ‘insecurity thesis’ where Anglo Saxon states, driven by
the global economy, the economic short-termism of financial markets and
an appetite for deregulation, create an overall insecurity in the labour market.
Quite specific Irish determinants include the crucial role of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and the human resource and production policies of global
companies (Wickham and Bobek 2016). Within the context of the EU
employment strategy and regulatory framework, Ireland approaches employ-
ment policy with an overall ‘light touch’ ideology which facilitates lax
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regulation, weak oversight and union-free workplaces enabling Ireland adopt
a low-road strategy of competing on cost rather than quality (Hickman and
Dundon 2016). Just-in-time production processes and service models are a
key feature of international franchise contracts, leaving sub-contracting ser-
vice providers little option other than to minimize production costs and max-
imize production flexibility. O’Sullivan et al. (2015 ) explain atypical and
precarious employment as an outcome of various practical drivers, including
increasing levels of work during non-standard hours, requirements for flexibil-
ity in demand-led services, absence of an accessible, affordable childcare sys-
tem, current employment legislation and particular resourcing models of
education and health services. Some sectors appear particularly vulnerable.
Wickham and Bobek (2015 ) identify an increase in ‘bogus self-employment’
which they attribute to cost saving initiatives by construction firms seeking
to reduce direct employment costs. Of the 5 .8 per cent of Irish employees
who work ‘variable’ hours, the highest proportion are employed in variable
part-time hours, low-hours and non-standard hours in the wholesale/retail,
accommodation/food and health and social work sectors. The crisis has had
a direct impact. Public and voluntary sector cuts have shifted Ireland’s public
sector resource model towards greater use of service level agreements. The
increased use of competitive tendering and procurement has increased the
use of hybrid and low-hour contracts. Increased privatization also creates
downward pressure on terms and conditions of private sector employees as
tenderers seek to reduce costs (CWI 2015). Many public bodies, private sec-
tor companies including retail multiples, and charities have also embedded
new forms of internships in their human resource model, which in turn creates
unfair competition and places downward pressure on wages (Murphy 2015).
Low-pay, Part-time and Precarious Work in Ireland
These drivers have interacted with the changing welfare architecture to
impact on the nature of Irish employment. This section proceeds by first
examining Irish employment trends, the changing quality of Irish employ-
ment, the use of ‘if and when’ contracts, and the extent of low-pay in Ireland.
Working time trends, part-time and temporary employment
From 2014, the Irish economy experienced employment growth. The
increase in total employment of 46 ,900 (+2 .4 per cent) in the year to Q1
2016 was represented by an increase in full-time employment of 30,700
(+2.1 per cent) and an increase in part-time employment of 16,300 (+3.7
per cent), a total 1,636,400 employees, up 37,900 (+2 .4 per cent) over
the year. Wickham and Bobek (2016 ) note overall improvement in the quality
of employment albeit alongside a general rise in employment insecurity
caused by growing de-institutionalization of the employment relationship.
Not all temporary or part-time jobs are bad jobs (54 per cent, above the
European average, of Irish temporary workers are in high-skill jobs). It is
when involuntary low hours, part-time variable and temporary contracts
combine with low-pay that workers experience precarious conditions.
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The incidence of part-time work Ireland is high at 24.4 per cent in 2013
compared to 14.1 per cent for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) (2016). Numbers working in variable part-time
hours fell slightly from 1998 to 2007 , almost doubled between 2007 and
2014 and showed a slight decline to 2016 , suggesting the crisis was a clear
driver and that, post-crisis, this trend may be in reverse. The overall incidence
of temporary workers (including seasonal workers and fixed-term contracts) in
the workforce in Ireland rose from 8 per cent in 2008 to 10 per cent in
2013, but compares well with an OECD average of11 .1 per cent. However,
the share of temporary employment for the 15–24 age group rose from 12
per cent in 2007 to 32 per cent in 2013 , suggesting a structural issue for
youth employment (OECD 2016). While 44 per cent of the low-paid work
35 hours or more per week, relative to employees overall, the low-paid are
more concentrated in low-hours work with 25 per cent working less than
20 hours per week and more likely to be on a temporary contract (16.3 per
cent) than overall workers (8 .4 per cent) (Collins 2015). O’Sullivan et al.
(2015) find the proportion working part time because they could not find
full-time work is higher in Ireland (41 .4 per cent) than in the EU (29.6 per
cent in EU28), and the proportion of part-time employees who want to work
more hours is higher in Ireland (28.7 per cent) than the EU (22 .2 per cent in
EU28 ). LPC (2016 : 34) found men did not experience the overall decrease
in involuntary part-time employment during the period 2013–14.
Globally, technical change is increasing the number of both good (lovely)
and bad (lousy) jobs (Goos and Manning 2007). Labour market segmentation
limits transition or progression from temporary to permanent contracts of
employment (OECD 2014 ). This is particularly the case in Ireland from
2011 to 2014 where FDI sectors maintained growth in high-tech
manufacturing and new internet services alongside growth in low-paid jobs
(Wickham and Bobek 2016: 19 ; Broughton and Welz 2013). Post-crisis,
new Irish jobs are in fact disproportionately highly skilled; however, processes
of privatization and marketization are also turning some previously ‘good
bad’ jobs into ‘bad’ jobs, with less security, low and irregular pay and low
trade union organization (Flecker and Hermann 2011 ). Different employ-
ment patterns dominate in certain sectors. Wickham and Bobek’s (2016 : 7)
sectoral analysis in finance, construction, hospitality and information technol-
ogy found ‘bad’ jobs in all four sectors, and most crucially that ‘flexibility is
now enforced on workers’. In 2015 ,38 per cent of the Irish construction sec-
tor were in ‘self-employment’ but 71 per cent of this group had no employees,
a significant number of whom may be ‘bogus’ self-employed. In Irish third-
level education, those on temporary contracts are ‘suppressed upon expira-
tion’ (Courtois and O’Keefe 2015 : 43). O’Sullivan et al. (2015), despite data
deficits, found widespread use of types of ‘if and when’ contracts.
How many are low-paid and who are they?
Low-pay has been growing in Ireland since 2004. Ireland has one of the
highest incidences of low-pay in the OECD and is the most unequal for mar-
ket income of all OECD countries (OECD 2015 ). Collins (2015), using 2013
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SILC data, found 30.3 per cent of employees (approx. 400,000) lie below
the Eurostat low-pay threshold (two-thirds of median hourly earnings) of
€12.20. Irish employees in precarious or non-regular employment are young,
work in low-skilled occupations, and are more likely to be female, while 22
per cent have not completed secondary education (OECD 2015). More than
one-third of the low-paid are aged under 30 and between 60 per cent and
65 per cent of the low-paid are aged under 40, but low-pay also extends
across the life cycle with many workers low-paid over long periods of working
life (Broughton and Welz 2013).17.8 per cent of full-time workers were low-
paid in 2000 , this rose to 23.3 per cent in 2013 (Collins 2015). High female
low-pay rates are not new, only 20 per cent of Irish women earn more than
€50,000 per year, 60 per cent were low-paid in 2013, and in 2014, 74.2
per cent of those on the minimum wage were women (LPC 2016). However,
the crisis occasioned growth in male low-paid employment so that 40 per cent
of low-paid are now men (NERI 2016). By 2013, one in every five full-time
male employees was low paid and involuntary male part-time underemploy-
ment doubled during the crisis period. While many non-Irish nationals
(13.9 per cent of all employees) are in well paid employment, in 2014, 26
per cent of all minimum wage employees were non-Irish nationals (LPC
2016). Almost one in four low-paid are in the wholesale and retail sector,
with almost one in six in the accommodation and food sector.
Income Security and Job Security in Ireland
Using the schema identified in the first section, we examine reconfigurations
that hasten flex-insecurity, first examining Irish social security and activation
changes (income security) then examining employment regulation (job
security).
Income security
Recent social security cuts have made income support less decommodifying so
that claimants are more likely to have to engage in paid employment. Three
types of changes are discussed and summarized in table 1: (1) changes that
recommodify welfare; (2) activation changes that increase conditionality; (3)
changes to enable access to in work compensation.
Recommodifying welfare. Irish social assistance rates remain at 2011 rates, are
regarded as relatively generous and, as transfers, have proven efficacious at
reducing high levels of market inequality and mitigating relative poverty
(Watson et al. 2012). Nonetheless, working-age claimants experienced a
significant range of austerity cuts. The Christmas Bonus was abolished in
2009 . Budgets 2010 and 2011 directly reduced the generosity of income
payments by €16 per week. Together these reduced by 10 per cent the
value of working-aged payments. During 2009–10, social assistance
payments for unemployed people aged under 25 were halved, and in
2014 , further age-related cuts were implemented. Table 1 outlines a series
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of changes in social insurance rates, eligibility and entitlement criteria
implemented during the period 2009–14. These followed similar
restrictions in previous ‘mini’ crisis budgets, the Dirty Dozen cuts in 1992
and the Savage Sixteen in 2004 , which together constitute a longer-term
pattern of decommodifying Irish welfare (Murphy 2009). More onerous
eligibility criteria also made it harder to qualify for in-work benefits,
excluding more low-paid and precarious workers from social protection
(Murphy and Loftus 2015). The fourth section discusses a range of cuts to
the One Parent Family Payment (OFP) for lone parents.
Activation. Greater conditionality has been associated with in-work poverty.
Irish labour activation policy has converged towards a work-first conditional
regime with new penalties and sanctions and a broader range of job-seeking
requirements applied to a larger section of the working-age welfare
population (Murphy 2016a). Ireland is historically considered to be ‘light’
in the implementation of conduct conditions (Murphy 2016a). However,
conduct conditions intensified during the crisis period with three specific
reforms increasing the job search obligations of unemployed jobseekers,
lone parents and young people, and extending the range of penalties for
failing to meet these new obligations (Murphy 2016a). Early crisis attempts
to increase labour market conditionality for all working-age claimants lost
political momentum, but the reform proceeded for the least politically
protected group, lone parents, and may yet be implemented for partners
and people with disabilities under the activation strategy Pathways to Work
2016–2020 (DSP 2016 ). From late 2015 , the introduction of ‘JobPath’ a
pay-by-results privatization of public employment services (PES) will further
increase the use of sanctions. In 2017, jobsearch obligations will be
extended to claimants in part-time employment and in receipt of in-work-
benefits (Murphy 2016a), and like the UK Universal Credit, in-work
conditionality may ultimately require part-time workers to access multiple
part-time jobs.
In-work compensation. Crisis-related labour market changes including lower hours
of employment led to increased numbers of precarious workers reliant on in-
work compensation. The state, while recommodifying welfare claimants, then
had to increase the use of state subsidies to make their low-hours or low-paid
work sustainable. Increased interaction between the social welfare system and
low-paid work was evident before, but intensified during the crisis. Figure 1
shows how expenditure on, and the numbers claiming, Family Income
Supplement – the main Irish in-work-benefit available to families with
children who reach a threshold of 19.5 hours paid employment per week –
increased during the crisis (from 28,223 claims in 2010 to 44 ,159 in
2013, and 50 ,306 in 2014 ). Improved programme design and
information campaigns account for some of this increase, but declining
hours worked accounts for more of the increased numbers. Figure 2 shows
a sharp rise in the numbers of low-hour or casual workers allowed retain a
portion of the weekly jobseekers’ payment (provided they do not exceed
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Figure 1
Growth in Family Income Supplement expenditure and claims 2002–15
Source: Collins and Murphy 2016: 77 . [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Figure 2
Growth in casual and part-time workers on the Live Register, 2002–15
Source: Collins and Murphy 2016 : 79. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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three days of paid employment per week). In what may be a post-crisis shift,
the numbers availing of this facility peaked in 2012 and subsequently
dropped. A number of atypical workers fall between these two in-work
compensation schemes, working more than three days but less than
19.5 hours per week (Murphy and Loftus 2015) and unable to access social
protection.
Employment regulation
Even before the crisis, Ireland had insufficient safeguards in the form of
employment protection legislation (EPL) to limit negative and perilous forms
of atypical work; before, during and after the crisis, there is evidence of weak
implementation, oversight and compliance of labor regulation (Turner and
O’Sullivan 2013: Hickman and Dundon 2016 ). During the crisis, many
‘anchor points’ of Irish employment protection were removed in a Troika-
induced reform of Ireland’s employment regulation, industrial relations bod-
ies and wage-setting mechanisms (Wickham and Bobek 2016 ; Hickman and
Dundon 2016: 205–6). A regressive reform in the name of flexibility was the
restructuring of the Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) to remove rights to basic
working conditions including overtime and Sunday working premiums. This
was a ‘considerable diminution’ of conditions of employment with potential
to create ‘a race to the bottom in low-pay sectors of the economy’ (Turner
and O’Sullivan 2013 : 216).
In figure 3, Ireland scores relatively poorly on strictness of EPL, below the
OECD average on three out of four indicators: protection of permanent
workers against individual and collective dismissals (2.07); protection of per-
manent workers against (individual) dismissal (1.50 ); specific requirements
for collective dismissal (3.5 ); and in the bottom six of OECD states for regu-
lation on temporary forms of employment (1 .21 ); with a slight worsening in
Figure 3
Employment protection in Euro Area 2008 and 2013
Source: OECD 2013 . Notes: Index scale: 0 = least restrictive; 6 = most restrictive.
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EPL or labour market liberalisation from 2008 to 2013 (OECD 2016). In
addition, seeing opportunity in crisis, employers have taken advantage of light
or absent EPL to advance more precarious employment practice. Three
examples suffice: (1 ) weak enforcement and monitoring of taxation compli-
ance fails to protect against the phenomena of bogus self-employment, where
work offers in some sectors, particularly construction, are contingent on the
would-be worker becoming self-employed (Wickham and Bobek 2016).
Despite the collapse in employment in the Irish construction sector, the num-
ber of solo self-employed in the sector is almost the same as at the height of the
boom (Wickham and Bobek 2016); (2) Ireland also fares poorly on regulating
internships and traineeships, particularly failing to regulate for social protec-
tion, remuneration and duration (EC 2012). This absence of protection
enabled the state to develop active labour market measures such as unpaid
internships which legitimated exploitative practices in the public, private
and voluntary sectors (Murphy 2015); (3 ) legislative reforms to protect
workers may have triggered new employment practices as employers sought
to avoid the implications of such EPL (O’Sullivan et al. 2015 ). The Organiza-
tion of Working Time Act,1997 attempted to protect against zero-hour con-
tracts by including a protective ‘minimum hour requirement’. Over time, this
provision was bypassed by employers through the use of ‘if and when’ con-
tracts (O’Sullivan et al. 2015 ). Similar in outcome to UK zero-hour contracts,
‘if and when’ contracts offer no guaranteed hours of work but, unlike fixed-
hour contracts, impose no legal obligations on the worker to accept the offer
of any particular rota of work. In practice, however, workers feel they will be
penalized if they refuse to accept ‘hours’ while at the same time are often not
offered sufficient hours to make employment sustainable (Loftus 2012 ).
Having set the context for income and job security or income support
recommodification, work-first activation and weak labour market regulation,
the next section examines how welfare architecture combines to influence
and constrain the labour market possibilities and lived reality of vulnerable
workers in Ireland.
The Labour Market Reality of Women, Vulnerable Migrants
and Young People
This section examines the post-crisis labour market reality for groups Turner
and O’Sullivan (2013) identify as disproportionately likely to be covered
under sectoral minimum wage agreements: women, young people, non-
nationals and part-time workers, but also seeks to examine differences within
these heterogeneous groups. We first examine the experience of social welfare
dependent mothers whose labour market participation is negotiated through,
and shaped by, gendered income support rules, we then examine how young
people without choice are exploited in unpaid labour market internships,
before turning to the experiences of vulnerable migrant workers working in
a segmented labour markets without adequate worker protection.
The arguments of employer organizations that flexible contracts suit cer-
tain employees are contested by quantitative and qualitative evidence that
many part-time workers want but cannot access more part-time hours
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(O’Sullivan et al. 2015; Loftus 2012 ; Moran 2016). Trade unions and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) stress the negative impact on working
and personal life of these unpopular contracts. The rate of material depriva-
tion of minimum wage workers is 31.8 per cent (over12 per cent higher than
the general rate of employees experiencing deprivation). Of those at risk of
poverty,14 per cent are at work, these ‘working poor’ represent 6.1 per cent
of all workers, while 2.4 per cent of workers are in consistent poverty (CSO
2014). Unpredictable work incurs additional costs on households and indi-
viduals regarding travel, fuel, personal costs and childcare (Collins et al.
2012). ‘Floating’ forms of work are more costly in terms of finance and stress;
they require contingency planning and stand-by arrangements without guar-
anteed work or income (Darmon and Perez 2010).
Women
Non-standard’ work, especially marginal employment, is often explained as
the joint result of a need for women to supplement a male breadwinner model
and companies’ need for flexible labour input. While male workers increas-
ingly find themselves in precarious work, it is still the case that more women
than men work one to eight, nine to 18 and 19–35 hours per week, and
96 per cent of employees who cite caring responsibilities as the reason for
working part-time are women (Collins 2015). Primary carers lacking afford-
able, accessible childcare are unlikely to want unpredictable hours. Many
are lone parents or partners/spouses of jobseekers who live in social welfare
dependent and low-work-intensity households. At risk of poverty and depriva-
tion, lacking childcare and trapped in very local job markets, they often sur-
vive by combining low-hours of part-time work with social welfare income.
Managing the interaction between low-paid work, variable hours and social
welfare means-testing rules is difficult, necessitating ongoing negotiations with
welfare officers, employers and family, often from a situation of powerlessness.
To illustrate, a brief account of this complexity and recent change is now
offered, drawing attention to the overlap and differences between different
categories of low income women.
In Budget 2012 and 2013, the Irish Government introduced structural
reforms to an existing OFP, a social assistance for payment for lone parents
with at least one child aged under18 (21 if child in full-time education). First,
eligibility to OFP was restricted to lone parents with children younger than
seven. Second, a higher earnings disregard for lone parents – originally given
in recognition of high childcare costs – was to be reduced in four annual cuts
of €15 to align with Jobseeker’s Allowance. Third, jobseeker activation condi-
tions were extended to former OFP recipients, so they are now required to be
capable of, available for, and genuinely seek full-time employment. Interac-
tion between earned income and OFP is complex; benefit clawbacks cause sig-
nificant poverty and unemployment traps (Murphy 2014 ; OECD 2015 : 2).
Nonetheless, 34 per cent of these lone parents worked part-time in 2014.
Different rules apply to married or cohabitating social welfare dependent
mothers. A jobseeker receives an addition of 70 per cent of the adult rate
on behalf of a partner/spouse as long as the partner’s/spouse’s earnings from
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part-time employment are below a weekly ‘dependency’ threshold (€100 in
2016). Women comprise over 90 per cent of these partners/spouses
(Murphy 2016b). When a partner earns income from part-time employment,
her earnings impact not only on the amount of ‘addition’ paid, but also
impact on the overall family payment, the jobseeker claimant and the ‘part-
ner’ are each allowed earn €20 per day before the family welfare payment
is reduced by 60 cents for every €1 earned. While the primary claimant is
restricted to three days’ part-time work, the partner has no such restriction
and can work flexibly across the week. Between 40 and 60 per cent of ‘part-
ners’ utilized these earnings disregards in 2015, suggesting an embedded pat-
tern of low-paid and part-time work for many partners (Murphy 2016b).
At one level, these relatively generous (when compared to UK) income dis-
regards make participation in low-paid and low-hours work sustainable for
these lone parents and partners. The greater flexibility and capacity to work
across the week makes it easier to find part-time work, but employers also
exploit such flexibility and stretch hours and tasks across the week, making
childcare and labour participation more costly. Variable working hours play
havoc with the reality of life on social welfare. Welfare payments have to be
constantly renegotiated, workers may not be guaranteed sufficient hours to
access in-work-benefits and, as lone parents found, social security rule changes
can change the viability of previous employment practices. Child care and
family arrangements have to be constantly juggled. We also see inequitable
treatment based on the family status of two groups of women, with lone par-
ents pushed towards full-time work and partners in coupled households facil-
itated to choose whether and how they wish to access paid employment.
Young people
Intergenerational inequality has been a hallmark of the Irish crisis, with young
people likely to experience generational scarring and delayed development of
key lifecycle transitions. Young people are not homogenous and class deter-
mines their likelihood of emigration, with the better educated and those in
employment more likely to emigrate, leaving the less well educated locked
into the indigenous or local labour market (CSO 2014). Likewise, there is
inequality of opportunity in accessing education, training and entry-level work
experiences, with better off families more able to mitigate an adult child’s low
income. Despite higher youth emigration rates, young jobseekers still experi-
ence double the rate of unemployment as the 25–65 age cohort and Irish
NEET (young people ‘not in employment, education or training’) increased
significantly from 12.5 per cent in 2007 to peak at 24.1 per cent in 2010
(NERI 2016 ). Austerity policy decisions halved welfare rates for under-25s
and created new forms of entry-level statutory jobs so that young teachers,
nurses and state employees have lower wages and poorer terms and condi-
tions than established peers (Courtois and O’Keefe 2015). Other entry-level
jobs have disappeared, sometimes replaced by internships.
Perlin notes that ‘young people can hardly believe in a world without
internships, part of a brave new economy of intense competition and altered
expectations’ (Perlin 2012: 3 ). In 2011, the Irish Government established
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‘JobBridge’ as a temporary labour market internship programme. For a six-
or nine-month period, participants receive an allowance of €52 .50 per week
on top of age-related social welfare entitlements. Light monitoring systems
were adopted to lessen obstacles for employers using this largely self-
regulating programme. Employers who meet basic eligibility criteria directly
recruit and select eligible unemployed applicants. The annual numbers par-
ticipating in such internships peaked at 12,654 in 2014 , and by the end of
2015, over 46,500 people had participated in JobBridge. In 2013 , the vast
majority of participants were aged under 34, 65 per cent had degree level
education or higher and 72 per cent had been previously employed full time.
Evaluations found monitoring was lax and inadequate; there was evidence of
deadweight and displacement of entry-level jobs and persistent complaints
about variable quality and poor experiences (NYCI 2015). Parliamentary
committees, trade unions, NGOs and political parties called for the closure
or fundamental reform (Murphy 2015) of JobBridge. While presented as a
voluntary labour market programme, there are nuances in how claimants per-
ceived participation in JobBridge. Economic compulsion means people have
little choice but to do what they can to supplement inadequate income (EC
2012). In 2014 , a youth JobBridge First Steps became a (temporary) manda-
tory requirement of the 2014 Youth Guarantee. JobBridge was closed to new
entrants in October 2016, a new work experience programme programme
will be launched in 2017.
Vulnerable migrants
One in eight people living in Ireland were not born in Ireland. After a
sustained period of net emigration from Ireland, summer 2016 saw the
return of net migration into Ireland. Migrants constitute a diverse population
and, while many are well paid, a significant cohort are concentrated in low-
paid service sectors such as food, retail, health-related services and private
households and experience high incidences of labour exploitation and ‘if
and when’ contracts (LPC 2016; MRCI 2015a). Highlighting intersectional
vulnerability, this section explores how welfare architecture impacts migrant
women in the home care sector.
Analysis of the employment conditions of 109 home care migrant workers
found many employed by, and working for, two or more private sector compa-
nies on the same day, and paid only for the time spent in each client’s home
(not for periods of travel), resulting in very low wages (MRCI 2015b). The
study found weak forms of employment contracts without guaranteed hours.
It documented high levels of staff turnover and poor terms and conditions such
as anti-social hours, as well as high levels of exploitation, contractual issues and
discrimination.Workers are reluctant to file complaints for fear of losing hours,
clients or jobs, feel undervalued and excluded from decision-making processes,
and they experience poor staff morale and work-related stress. Black and eth-
nic minority workers also experience a heightened risk of racism and discrim-
ination, as some clients refuse services from such workers. Migrant care
workers’ experience can be contrasted with statutory Health Service Executive
home help staff who are predominantly indigenous Irish and who, following
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successful industrial action in April 2014, now experience trade union moni-
tored guaranteed weekly hours and an annualized-hours contract. We see the
variegated experience of different groups of women, with ethnic and legal sta-
tus determining employment sector and quality of employment.
The three short case studies show how welfare architecture shapes the
labour market reality for different workers. Flex-insecurity occurs in a modi-
fied male breadwinner gender regime and produces gendered, class and eth-
nically differentiated outcomes in segregated occupational sectors (Murphy
2016b). Intersectionality interacts with legally neutral welfare architecture
to increase vulnerability to precarity in the case of gender, family status, eth-
nicity and class. Some groups, although vulnerable, have more personal or
structural power to negotiate. Such differential power will partially determine
the shape the welfare architecture of the future.
Shaping the Welfare Architecture of the Future: The Social
Politics of Irish Flex-insecurity
This article has argued that, rather than flexicurity, a significant proportion of
the Irish labour force experience flex-insecurity where welfare architecture, in
design and in implementation, offers less than adequate levels of income and
job security so that low-pay, temporary, variable and under-employment is
the experience of too many Irish workers. The policy direction is often an out-
come of unintended consequences and is not necessarily linear, but the overall
pattern is consistent. Working-age social protection commodified while num-
bers accessing in-work compensation grew and activation intensified condi-
tionality. EPL features of this policy mix existed pre-crisis, but during the
crisis inadequate protection, and weak monitoring and implementation pro-
vided the opportunity for employers to shift towards legally viable but precar-
ious practices, including bogus self-employment ‘if and when’ contracts and
unpaid internships. The case studies also show how intersectionality matters
with class, gender ethnicity and age intersecting precarity. The question
now, post-crisis, is whether policy will continue in this direction or whether
it can be halted and reversed. Might the increase in variable hours be simply
a reversible cyclical outcome of recession or will it be allowed become a struc-
tural turn in the mode of production (Collins 2015)? There are grounds for
both optimism and pessimism in this regard.
Reasons for pessimism include the likelihood that in 2017 precarious
workers will experience ‘in-work-conditionality’ in a privatized PES more
likely to implement a more punitive activation policy. Wilthagen and Tros
(2004 :16 ) note the importance of ‘positive coordination’ and trust in achiev-
ing ‘negotiated flexibility’. The collapse of Ireland’s corporate bargaining
structure means a less optimal governance structure to negotiate flexibility
and security between relevant actors (Hickman and Dundon 2016). Brexit
also provides grounds for pessimism, creating more anxiety about and a stron-
ger focus on maintaining wage competitiveness (LPC 2016: 20). Optimisti-
cally, following Wilthagen and Tros (2004: 18), it is reasonable to assume a
more positive economic environment opens up the opportunity for income
and job security. There is evidence that precarious workers are organizing.
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There is a growing consensus, for example, that internships be minimized,
regulated and compensated, the Government has committed to wind down
the JobBridge internship programme and a Low-pay Commission (LPC)
was established in 2014.
It is too early to make a judgement on the experience of the LPC, but
commissioned research on the use of variable-hour contracts and the gen-
dered nature of the low-pay has so far realized little in outcomes. The Irish
minimum wage real value relative to median wages fell during the crisis
period (OECD 2015) and since 2011 remained frozen at €8.65. An LPC
majority recommendation for a 50 cent increase to €9.15 was implemented
in January 2016. Minority trade union and NGO reports argued this was
well short of the living wage (€11 .65 in 2015 terms). Having been abolished
during the crisis, in January 2014, new JLCs were established to develop sec-
toral minimum wages for six low-paid sectors: hospitality, catering, retail, con-
tract cleaning, security and agriculture; more constrained in their powers,
they have been slow to establish new sectoral minimum wages.
Much can be done to prevent a pattern of embedded flex-insecurity,
including sectoral focused reforms, procurement policy, social clauses, invest-
ment in enabling activation, childcare and public services. However, given
who benefits from such corporate welfare (state-funded internships, in-work
subsidies, earned income disregards, light touch regulation and inadequate
monitoring and enforcement), vetoes to reforms are strong and it is not clear
there is sufficient political will to act. Government faces pressure from
employers in particular sectors, but also from those lobbying for overall com-
petitiveness of the Irish economy (McElwee 2016 ), and this will intensify in
the context of Brexit (LPC 2016). Dualism also benefits many (middle-class)
consumers who manage the stresses of life by availing of cheaper services,
including childcare and home care, while working in better regulated and
higher paid employment. Segmented labour markets and categorical social
welfare systems also create false tensions between groups of workers and
claimants which dilute intersectional solidarities across gender, generational,
ethnic and class grounds. Differences are exploited when certain workers or
claimants are scapegoated in political and public discourse (e.g. lone parents
and young people [Murphy 2014, 2016a]). Trade unions are weaker, den-
sity declined from 54 per cent in 1980 to 31.2 per cent in 2012 ; however,
some trade unions are innovating with new forms of organizing in these chal-
lenging sectors. Precarious workers have generated solidarity by leading cam-
paigns against precarious work practices in third level education (Third Level
Watch); exploitative internships (#WorkMustPay); labour exploitation of au
pairs (Migrants Rights Centre Ireland); and ‘if and when’ contracts for
home-helps (SIPTU). Nonetheless, given the welfare architecture of flex-
insecurity, it is not unrealistic to conclude that costs of production seem likely
to continue to be pushed onto the low-paid worker with little power or choice
but to comply.
Note
1. Ability to combine employment with other life goals including care.
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